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BANKRUPTCY CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LIMITATION ON THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM AN ORDER FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION IN A CoRPORATE REORGANIZATION' UNDER THE CHANDLER AcT A

petition for reorganization was approved by the district court, and members of a
bondholders' committee were granted an allowance for services. As the award
was much less than the amount sought, the committee asked leave to appeal of
the circuit court of appeals. Leave was granted and the allowance increased.1
In the Supreme Court the petitioner claimed that the circuit court of appeals
had no jurisdiction on the theory that the committee was confined to an appeal
as of right,2 which could only be taken by filing notice of appeal in the district
court. Held, the circuit court of appeals properly allowed the petition for leave
to appeal under section 2 5o of the Chandler Act 3 and section 24 (a) was inapplicable. Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U. S. 382, 60 S. Ct.
595 (1940).

1
2
3

In re Albert Dickinson Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 771.
52 Stat. L. 854-855, § 24a (1938), I I U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 47a.
52 Stat. L. 901 (1938), I I U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 650.
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Federal bankruptcy legislation governs appeals in matters peculiar to bankruptcy, as distinguished from the general federal appellate procedure,4 and
appeals in corporate reorganizations are taken in the same manner in the absence
of special statutory provisions.5 The old Bankruptcy Act distinguished between
proceedings and controversies in bankruptcy,6 and appeals of right involving
the former were permitted only under special circumstances. 7 Separate provision
was made for independent appeals from allowances, 8 but the. provision for appeals
from proceedings and controversies still controlled.9 The federal courts agreed
that allowances to attorneys or committeemen did not come within those "orders
allowing a claim" which were proceedings appealable of right, for such "claims"
were confined to prior debts against the bankrupt estate and did not include
allowances for administrative expenses.10 This ruling was upheld by the Supreme
Court.11 The 1938 revision of the bankruptcy law made all orders, decrees or
judgments in bankruptcy appealable of right, subject to a $500 minimum limitation.12 However, to the separate provision for appeals from orders granting
or refusing allowances for compensation which provided that such appeals "may
be taken to the circuit court of appeals" were added the controversial words
"and allowed by"; so that it now reads "taken to and allowed by." 18 In inter6 AM. JuR. 836 (1937).
"Since it is provided in division (k) that 'all other provisions of this act, except
such as are inconsistent with the provisions of this section 77 B, shall apply to proceedings instituted under this section,' appeals under § 77B would seem to be governed by the same provisions as appeals in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings." Annotation, 79 L. Ed. II33 at II95 (1935); Vitagraph, Inc. v. St. Louis Properties Corp.,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 590.
6
Proceedings in bankruptcy concern those relations between the bankrupt and
his creditors, but the issues raised between intervening parties, which involve substantial rights, are controversies. In re Prudential Lithograph Co., Inc., (C. C. A. 2d,
1920) 270 F. 469.
7
" • • • appeals, as in equity cases, may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the
courts of bankruptcy to the circuit court of appeals of the United States ••• in the
following cases, to wit, (1) from a judgment adjudging or refusing to adjudge the
defendant a bankrupt; (2) from a judgment granting or denying a discharge; and
(3) from a judgment allowing or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollars or
over." 30 Stat. L. 553, § 25a (1898), II U. S. C. (1934), § 48(a).
8
48 Stat. L. 917, § 77B (c)(9) (1934), II U.S. C. (1934), § 207 (c) (9).
9
Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U.S. 172, 57 S. Ct. 680 (1936).
10 Wingert v. Smead, (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 351; In re New York
Investors, Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 179.
11
Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U. S. 172, 57 S. Ct. 680 (1936)
(involving the allowance of fees in a foreclosure suit, disallowance in the district court
in reorganization proceedings and denial of appeal by the circuit court of appeals).
12 "The Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States ••• are hereby invested
with appellate jurisdiction from the several courts of bankruptcy in their respective
jurisdictions in proceedings in bankruptcy ••. and in controversies arising in proceedi!}gs in bankruptcy•••• Provided further, That when any order, decree, or judgment
involves less than $500, an appeal therefrom may be taken only upon allowance of the
appellate court." 52 Stat. L. 854, § 24a (1938), II U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 47a.
18 52 Stat. L. 901, § 250 (1938), II U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 650.
¼
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preting this provision one circuit court of appeals has held that appeals from
allowances of $500 or more may be had as of right.14 The ruling in the principal case that section 250 describes only one appellate procedure and that it is
completely divorced from section 24 (a) is clearly sound,15 and its practicality is
borne out by the previous history of appeals from allowances for compensation.18
Nevertheless the Court had to supplement the wording of the statute in order to
reach the desired restrictive interpretation. Section 24 (a) would indicate that
the allowance, as an 'order, was appealable as of right,17 the history of such practice notwithstanding, and the argument of the Court that the disjunctive must
be read into section 250 to sustain this contention is not compelling.18 The stand
of the Court is better explained by reference to the policy of the reorganization
legislation,19 which is calculated to put failing corporations on their feet as
quickly as possible. The restricted allowance of appeals may be attributed to the
self-declared duty of the Court to expedite proceedings under the statute.20

London v. O'Dougherty, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 524.
"Unlike appeals from other orders, appeals from compensation orders therefore
normally involve only one question of law-abuse of discretion. • .• To allow these
appeals as a matter of right is to encourage an unseemly parade to the appellate courts
and to add to the time and expense of administration." Principal case, 309 U. S. 382
at 389.
18 Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U.S. 172, 57 S. Ct. 680 (1936);
Wingert v. Smead, (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 351; In re New York Investors,
Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 179; Meyer v. Kenmore Granville Hotel Co.,
297 U.S. 160, 56 S. Ct. 405 (1936).
11 London v. O'Dougherty, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 524.
18 (a) It is conceivable that the wording of the statute describes both an appeal
as of right and a discretionary appeal, viz., "Appeals [from orders involving more than
$500 and from orders involving less than $500] may •.• be taken to [appeals as of
right from the former orders] and allowed by [ discretionary appeals from the latter
orders] the circuit court of appeals." 52 Stat. L. 901, § 250 (1938), II U. S. C
(Supp. 1939), § 650.
(b) Section 77B (c) (9) of which section 250 is the successor looked to the old
sections 24 and 25 for the determination of the manner of appeal. The new section
24 creates a distinction only between appeals from orders involving more than $500 and
appeals from orders involving Jess than $500. So that this might be carried out in section 250 it would be proper to read in the word "or," since in the construction of
statutes it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature.
In order to do this the courts are often compelled to construe "or" as meaning "and,"
and "and" as meaning "or." United States v. Fisk, 70 U. S. 445 (1865).
19 The delay and expense incident to railroad receivership and foreclosure sales
being the chief reason for the passage of the reorganization sections of the Bankruptcy
Act, to permit the perpetuation of either of those evils would be subversive of the spirit
of the new legislation. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. R., 294 U. S. 648, 55 S. Ct. 595 (1935).
20 Annotation, 79 L. Ed. u33 at u96-u97 (1935); Credit Alliance Corp.
v. Atlantic, Pacific & Gulf Ref. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 595.
14
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